ABSTRACT As the crucial component of intelligent transportation system, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are capable of providing a variety of safety-related functionalities and commercial-oriented applications, which significantly improves the driving experience. Due to the foreseen impact of VANETs, extensive studies in both academia and industry fields has been made, which emphasizes on effective VANETs implementations. In practical VANETs scenarios with open wireless communication characteristics, enhanced security strategies should be deployed in order to guarantee transmission safety. Moreover, individual vehicle needs to perform pre-defined authentication process toward all the acquired messages, some of which may be generated by abnormal devices or malicious attackers. In this case, with large amounts of anomaly messages to be authenticated during a relatively short time period, the denial of service (DoS) attack is possible. Note that the vehicle has limited computation capability and restrained storage. In this paper, we address the above issues by developing a secure and efficient authentication scheme with unsupervised anomaly detection. In our design, certificateless authentication technique is deployed for conditional privacy preserving, along with the Chinese remainder theorem for efficient group key distribution and dynamic updating. Subsequently, the corresponding unsupervised anomaly detection method is illustrated, which applies dynamic time warping for distance measurement. The proposed method could remarkably alleviate unnecessary authentication burden in vehicle side. DoS attack can also be prevented in this way. Furthermore, anomaly detection method is conducted by the involving road side units (RSUs), while the contents of the processing traffic flows are kept secret to RSUs during the entire process. Security analysis shows that our scheme can achieve desired security properties. Additionally, performance analysis demonstrates that our design is efficient compared with state-of-the-art.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, blossoming developments of advanced electronics and wireless communication techniques have triggered the standardization and implementation of efficient and universal intelligent transportation system (ITS), which is particularly essential for major metropolitan cities with increasing population [1] . With the prosperous future and promising benefit, ITS is responsible for providing innovative services relating to different modes of transport and traffic management. Meanwhile, the vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), emerging as the primary and dominant constituents of ITS, has attracted extensive attention from researchers [2] , [3] . The corresponding VANETs safetyrelated functionalities, such as vehicular driving reporting, and traffic congestion avoidance, are delivered to the vehicles to improve the driving security. Similarly, the commercialoriented applications including weather forecast and navigation are also available in VANETs [4] .
In general scenarios, typical VANETs infrastructure consists of three essential entities: the trusted authority (TA), the road side unit (RSU), and vehicle [5] , [6] . Envisaged as the trustworthy control center, TA is capable of conducting pivotal managements for all the vehicles and RSUs, such as user registration, key generation and distribution, as well as the vehicle data processing. In this perspective, substantial numbers of storage and computation capacity should be provided in TA side [7] . For this consideration, it is appropriate to adopt the cloud computing technique to VANETs construction, which has been researched by many academics in recent years. In cloud-based VANETs, the seamless coordination between TA and the deployed distributed cloud servers provides adequate computing and storing abilities to VANETs. Particularly, the cloud server is able to process massive data of multiple VANETs simultaneously. Above all, by utilizing specific data analyzing techniques including machine learning, the characteristics of individual VANETs entities can be acquired, thus various featured applications can be delivered to certain types of users. Moreover, the preliminary construction of the worldwide Internet of vehicle (IoV) is enabled in this way [8] , [9] .
The RSUs are the facilities established along the road one after another. RSU performs as the communication bridge combining TA and vehicles within its range [10] . To a certain degree, RSUs have the capability to conduct certain computation and store essential information in its memories [11] , [12] . Note that the wireless effective range of all these RSUs can cover the whole road. Therefore, impactful and timely VANETs services can be delivered to all involved vehicles on the road.
The vehicle performs as both the terminal customer and date collector at the same time [13] . On the one hand, TA offers all kinds of VANETs services and applications to the legitimate vehicles. On the other hand, useful road information including traffic congestion and emergency alerts are forwarded from vehicle to TA for further analysis. Each vehicle is equipped with an on-board unit (OBU), in which a wireless communication module is installed. OBU supports all the message transmission and reception from RSUs and neighboring vehicles.
Typically, a generalized VANET is enabled with two types of wireless networks [14] , [15] . The distributed selforganized wireless networks between the vehicles ensure seamless vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication, while the data exchange between particular vehicle and the surrounding RSU is assumed to be the vehicle-to-RSU (V2R) communication. Obviously, the persistent V2V and V2R communications provide high connectivity for the whole VANETs. However, both VANETs communications deploy the dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) through open wireless channel, thus vulnerable to multiple charted and uncharted security attacks. For example, in V2V and V2R communications, the messages transmission may be eavesdropped, blocked or even forged by malicious attackers.
In this case, strong and effective security strategies are required [16] .
With the purpose of guaranteeing the wireless transmission security, advanced mutual authentication strategies are necessary for VANETs [17] , [18] . In fact, lots of research achievements emphasizing on VANETs authentication have been made so far. However, some of the researches utilizes the distributed VANETs structure, which assumes that TA is in charge of the confidential key generation for all vehicles. In this way, the TA has complete control over all the authentication process, which may lead to key escrow problem. In order to address this issue, it is assumed that part of the vehicle key should be decided by the vehicle itself, and the generated partial key is kept secret to all other entities including the TA. Consequently, the certificateless cryptography [19] is introduced, which is a variant of ID-based cryptography with the intention to avoid the key escrow problem in key allocation. In certificateless VANETs design, the key generated by TA is considered as the partial secret key for particular vehicle, while another partial secret key is generated by vehicle itself. In this case, the impersonation attack towards certain vehicle is prevented. No repudiation for transmitted message is provided as well.
In practical VANETs scenarios, it is common that large numbers of vehicles may approach the effective range of individual RSU during a random short time interval. Hence, numerous messages are to be processed by RSU. Generally, it is possible that single RSU may receive several anomaly messages from disordered or compromised vehicles [20] . That is, the aforementioned authentication process should be conducted for every received message. Under special circumstance with an enormous number of invalid messages from attackers, heavy authentication computation is required [21] , [22] . Accordingly, the malicious attacker is able to conduct denial of service (DoS) attack by randomly sending massive meaningless messages to RSU. Upon receiving these messages, the RSU has to spend lots of time on processing the verification towards all the received messages, which leads to system unavailability for other legitimate vehicles [23] . Therefore, the filtering method towards the received messages can be adopted, where the invalid messages can then be previously detected. Hence, RSU could directly abandon the anomalies without going through the computation process. In this way, the authentication efficiency is improved, which is of significance for practical VANETs scenarios.
A. OUR RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we developed a secure and efficient certificateless authentication scheme with unsupervised anomaly detection. Our nontrivial efforts can be briefly summarized as follows: (1) Secure certificateless authentication scheme without pairing: In our design, certificateless cryptography is deployed to provide enhanced security properties. TA generates the partial private key for the VOLUME 6, 2018 participating vehicle, while the vehicle itself randomly selects another partial key. The key escrow problem is addressed accordingly. Therefore, non-repudiation characteristic is provided. Moreover, because the computation cost of one bilinear pairing operation is three or more times that of the point multiplication operation [24] , [25] , our scheme does not adopt any pairing operations during the entire authentication process. (2) Group key distribution providing efficient updating mechanism: The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is adopted to offer fast and convenient group key distribution. In our scheme, the centralized group key is generated by TA first. With the unique advantages of CRT, the whole key updating mechanism requires slight computation in TA side, while the legitimate vehicles don't need to update the stored decryption key. Consequently, the vehicle revocation and join operations can be conducted efficiently, which is suitable for practical largescale VANETs scenarios. (3) Unsupervised anomaly detection with dynamic time warping (DTW): Motivated by features of unsupervised learning technique, we apply the anomaly detection mechanism to VANETs authentication. Hence, abnormal messages in V2V and V2R communication can be detected before authentication. Considering that the messages are time-related, the dynamic time warping (DTW) method is applied for distance measurement. Hierarchical clustering is adopted as the binary classification method. The DoS attacks towards the VANETs system can be resisted. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly introduces the related research achievements. Section III illustrates some necessary preliminary works and the system model for the reader to obtain a better understanding of the topic. Section IV presents the proposed secure certificateless authentication scheme in detail. Section V describes the unsupervised anomaly detection method. Section VI demonstrates the formal security proofs and analysis. Section VII displays the performance analysis and experiment results for both the authentication scheme and the anomaly detection method. The conclusion is drawn in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
To the best of our knowledge, various secure strategies and cryptographic techniques have been deployed in current VANETs researches. In 2008, Zhang et al. proposed an efficient batch signature verification scheme [1] for V2R communication. Each vehicle is mapped to a distinct pseudo identity, while the real identity of specific vehicle can also be retrieved by TA. The total verification time can be significantly reduced by adopting the batch signature verification. Nevertheless, this scheme is vulnerable to replay attack [26] . Subsequently, Studer et al. [8] presented a novel authentication building block TESLA++, which is the DoS resilient version of TESLA [27] . On this basis, the corresponding hybrid VANET authentication mechanism (VAST) is designed. The elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) [28] is applied in order to provide fast authentication and non-repudiation. In 2011, Hao et al. proposed a distributed key management framework with cooperative message authentication [2] , where each RSU performs as the group key distributor. The compromised RSUs, as well as the malicious vehicles can be detected accordingly. With the generated pseudonyms for anonymous communication, Huang et al. [4] designed pseudonymous authenticationbased conditional privacy protocol (PACP). Similarly, in the circumstance with tamper-proof devices, Liu et al. proposed the IIBV scheme with one-time signing keys [3] . The authentication efficiency can be improved by adopting batch verification design. Thereafter, in 2014, Zhu et al. applied hash message authentication code (HMAC) to the scheme in [29] , where each vehicle verifies a small number of messages. In this way, the authentication burden of RSU side can be significantly alleviated. After this, Chuang and Lee [5] presented the trust-extended authentication mechanism (TEAM) for V2V communication networks. The concept of transitive trust relationships is employed to improve the authentication performance. In 2016, Shao et al. proposed a threshold anonymous VANETs authentication protocol [7] in the decentralized group model. With the assistance of the group signature scheme [30] , the proposed authentication protocol is featured with threshold authentication, efficient revocation, unforgeability, anonymity, and traceability. Afterwards, multiple authentication and group key management protocols in VANETs have been presented [31] - [35] .
Specifically, identity-based public-key cryptography (ID-PKC) [36] has been widely applied for certificate management in VANETs. Different from the traditional publickey cryptography (T-PKC), the unique information regarding the user identity is adopted as the public key of ID-PKC, such as the email address or phone number. In 2007, a privacypreserving protocol GSIS [11] is developed by Lin et al., which provides conditional privacy for vehicles. In this case, the desired traceability towards vehicles is available. In other words, the identity of the message sender can be revealed by legitimate authorities if necessary. In 2010, Sun et al. [16] presented an identity-based security scheme for VANETs to satisfy fundamental security requirements including authentication, non-repudiation, message integrity, and confidentiality. Meanwhile, the privacy-preserving defense technique is applied to handle misbehavior in VANETs access. In 2012, Shim [13] developed an efficient identity-based conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme (CPAS) supporting fast batch verification. However, the proposed protocol is vulnerable to modification attack [37] . Afterwards, Tzeng et al. introduced an improved identity-based batch verification scheme [38] with usage of only a small constant number of pairing and point multiplication computation. Similarly, aiming to reduce the computational complexity, He et al. [14] designed an identity-based conditional privacypreserving authentication (CPPA) scheme in VANETs.
74262 VOLUME 6, 2018 Note that the proposed scheme does not use bilinear pairing in order to reduce computation cost. Recently, Liu et al. constructed a realistic distributed conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme [15] for VANETs using identity-based cryptography and short-lifetime regionbased certificates.
In order to address the inherent key escrow problem existing in identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC), certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) is introduced [19] . The private partial keys are respectively generated by the semi-trusted key generation center (KGC) and the user itself. So far, multiple VANETs verification schemes based on CL-PKC have been proposed with the intention of providing conditional privacy. In 2012, Teng and Wu presented a security model for certificateless group key agreements [39] . Based on it, a constant-round CL-PKC group key agreement protocol for VANETs is designed. Thereafter, a fast certificateless authentication scheme RCS utilizing bilinear pairing is designed by Li and Wang [17] , where certain vehicles are selected as RSU assistants to reduce transmission cost. In 2014, Song et al. presented a lightweight certificateless and one-round key agreement scheme without pairing [10] . This scheme provides the way to relieve the workload of V2V authentication. Afterwards, in 2018, Tan et al. proposed a secure certificateless authentication and road message dissemination protocol [6] in VANETs. In the protocol, a certificateless signature and the relevant feedback mechanism are adopted for authentication and group key distribution.
In both V2V and V2R communication, high connectivity between the VANETs entities enables massive transmitted messages, thus causing heavy traffic. In this case, if the malicious attacker broadcasts large amounts of random messages during a short time interval, RSU has to verify all the meaningless messages before deriving the contents, which severely disrupts the regular operations in RSU side. For this consideration, typical intrusion detection designs have been applied to the VANETs to distinguish the anomaly traffic. In 2007, Raya et al. designed a security mechanism to detect and evict the malicious vehicles from the VANETs [21] . This scheme uses an entropy approach to model a normal behavior (NB) of a monitored vehicle. Similarly, Kumar and Chilamkurti introduced the trust aware collaborative learning automata-based intrusion detection system (T-CLAIDS) [40] for VANETs, where the Markov Chain Model (MCM) is constructed for representation of states and transitions in the network. The classifier is defined for detection of malicious activities in the network and is tuned based upon the collaborative trust index (CTI). In this way, all possible type of attacks towards the VANETs are included. Sedjelmaci et al. designed a light-weight intrusion detection mechanism [20] for service-oriented vehicular network (ELIDV) that aims to protect the network against three kinds of attacks: denial of service (DoS), integrity target, and false alert's generation. Subsequently, several intrusion detection schemes [41] , [42] are proposed.
III. MODEL DEFINITION AND PRELIMINARIES
With the purpose of facilitating the reader's understanding on our design, some necessary preliminaries are described, including the definition of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), Hash function, Chinese remainder theorem (CRT), as well as dynamic time warping (DTW). Subsequently, the corresponding notations, system model, and network assumptions are illustrated.
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY (ECC)
Let p > 3 be a prime, F p be the finite field of order p. a, b ∈ F p satisfy 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0. An elliptic curve E p (a, b) over the finite field F p is defined with the following equation:
where (x, y) ∈ F p . The addition operation on the curve is called point doubling when the two points are identical. Otherwise, it is called point addition. All the points on the curve, as well as the point at infinity ∞ form an additive Abelian group E(F p ). Note that ∞ = (−∞) serves as the identity element.
In general, the security of ECC depends on the difficulties of the following problems [28] :
Given two points P and Q over E p (a, b), the ECDLP problem is to determine the integer s
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem): Given three points P, sP and tP over E p (a, b) with s, t ∈ F p , the CDHP problem is to calculate the point stP over E p (a, b).
B. HASH FUNCTION
A one-way hash function is considered to be secure if the following properties can be achieved [43] : 1) Input a message x of arbitrary length, it is easy to compute a message digest of a fixed length output h(x).
2) Given y, it is difficult to compute
x = h −1 (y). 3) Given x, it is computationally infeasible to find x = x such that h(x ) = h(x) holds.
C. CHINESE REMAINDER THEOREM (CRT)
Let k 1 , . . . , k n be positive integers that are relatively prime in pairs. Then, for any given integers a 1 , . . . , a n , the system of congruences [44] X ≡ {a i mod k i } i∈ [1,n] has a unique solution modulo
D. DYNAMIC TIME WARPING (DTW)
Dynamic time warping (DTW) [45] is an effective technique to find the optimized alignment between two time-dependent sequences (time series). Note that the time sequences may vary in time or speed. DTW has been widely applied to automatically measure the distance or similarity between time series.
Let X = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) and Y = (y 1 , . . . , y M ) be the two time-dependent sequences, where N ∈ N and M ∈ M denote the length of sequence X and Y , respectively. Note that x n , y m ∈ F with n ∈ [1 : N ] and m ∈ [1 : M ], and F denotes the fixed feature space. DTW adopts the local distance measure defined as c : R × R → R ≥0 to calculate the cost matrix C ∈ R N ×M , where C(n, m) = c(x n , y m ). Each cell c(x, y) represents the distance between x and y. The goal is to find an alignment between X and Y with minimal overall distance. Intuitively, such an optimal alignment runs along a ''valley'' of low cost cells within the cost matrix C.
The (N , M )-warping path satisfies the following three requirements:
1) Boundary condition:
. The total cost c p (X , Y ) of a warping path p between X and Y with respect to the local distance measure c is defined as
Accordingly, the optimal warping path between X and Y is defined as the warping path p * with minimal total cost among all possible warping paths. In this case, the related total cost of p * is denoted as the DTW distance DTW (X , Y ) as follows:
where p is defined as an (N , M )-warping path.
E. NOTATIONS
As shown in Table 1 , the notations used in our scheme are listed, respectively with brief description.
F. SYSTEM MODEL
In our design, the entire VANETs system consists of three entities: the trust authority (TA), the road-side unit (RSU) and the vehicle. The brief architecture of the proposed VANETs system is shown in Fig. 1 . The corresponding description of the three entities are respectively illustrated below.
Trusted Authority (TA) is defined as the trustworthy control center for the entire VANETs system. TA is responsible for vehicle registration, key management, verification and other significant operations. In our assumption, TA is authentic and reliable at any time. As shown in Fig. 1 , TA forwards various applications including weather forecast, navigation, and Internet access to the legitimate vehicles. Meanwhile, the vehicle data such as the road congestion information are gathered and finally transmitted to TA for processing. The confidential keys allocated to RSUs and vehicles are also stored in TA. In this case, TA is assumed to have adequate storage and computation ability. Moreover, TA performs as the only authentic verifier for the whole VANETs, where all participating vehicles should be verified at first. Specifically, the rapid development of cloud computing facilitates the combination between traditional VANETs and cloud server. Thus, the private user data and key information can be stored in distributed cloud servers. Meanwhile, the computation ability of TA can be enhanced. The studies on cloud-assisted VANETs has become hot topic in recent years [25] , [31] .
1) Road-Side Unit (RSU)
is the unique infrastructure deployed by the road, which performs as the sole intermediaries between TA and vehicles. RSU is responsible for contacting the approaching vehicles utilizing dedicated short range communication (DSRC). With large numbers of RSUs deployed around the road, the vehicles can access the VANETs at any time. In practical scenarios, the RSUs are settled in isolated areas far away from TA, some are located in extremely harsh environment. Hence, without frequent maintenance, these RSUs may be easily compromised or disabled intentionally or unintentionally, resulting in information leakage of the involved vehicles. That is, malicious attackers may acquire the vehicle private information from storage of the compromised RSUs. For this consideration, in our design, we assume the RSUs to be semitrusted entities without full access to the details of the vehicle information. The vehicle data and key information are to be derived and processed in TA side.
2) VEHICLES
are designed to be VANETs service receivers and data collectors simultaneously. Each vehicle is equipped with the on-board unit (OBU) for interaction with RSUs and other vehicles. The corresponding secrets and derived group key are stored in the implemented tamper-proof device (TPD) in vehicle side. In our system model, the vehicle plate number is designated as the unique identity issued by TA, each of which clearly binds to certain driver. Moreover, for safety assurance, the driver's fingerprint/certificate card is adopted so that every time when the driver initiates his/her vehicle, the driver and the correlative vehicle is strictly related. For better description, in this paper, we consider the driver, the OBU, and the vehicle as one individual entity.
G. NETWORKS ASSUMPTION
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , TA has full access to the cloud server. Wired connection is enabled between TA and all the implemented RSUs for continuous data exchange. However, it is possible that some RSUs are compromised physically since they are far away from the TA. As a result, we assume in this paper the TA-RSU communication channel is safe for data transmission, while the RSU itself may be damaged, resulting in vehicle information disclosure.
In the proposed system model, two types of wireless interactions are displayed, including the vehicle to vehicle communication (V2V) and the vehicle to RSU communication (V2R). In a nutshell, the V2V communication is used for information sharing and cooperative data processing between the neighboring vehicles. While the V2R communication focuses on longitudinal connection between vehicle and RSU. Due to open wireless transmission characteristics, both V2V and V2R communication suffer from charted and uncharted attacks, thus proper authentication scheme is of significance. Moreover, in our scheme, a universal communication channel is necessary for all the legitimate vehicles within RSU effective range.
IV. PROPOSED SECURE CERTIFICATELESS AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
In this paper, emphasizing on the aforementioned issues, the secure certificateless authentication scheme, and the unsupervised anomaly detection method are respectively illustrated in Section IV and Section V. In this section, we describe the secure certificateless authentication and key distribution scheme involving TA, RSU, and multiple vehicles. The proposed scheme can be roughly classified into three different phases including offline registration phase, authentication phase, and group key distribution phase. Accordingly, the vehicle registration, and some nontrivial preparation on key initialization, is conducted in offline registration phase. Note that all the vehicles should register to TA before entering the VANETs system. In the next, major certificateless authentication steps are provided in the authentication phase. Subsequently, the group key is generated and distributed adopting CRT technique. Moreover, the dynamic group key updating strategy is introduced, which enables fast and efficient vehicle join and revocation operations.
Our design deploys the certificateless encryption strategy for vehicle verification. However, the bilinear pairing is not used with the purpose of reducing the computation cost. In this way, our method without pairing is suitable for resource limited practical VANETs scenarios. The security of the adopted ECC points multiplication is based on the difficulties of ECDLP and CDHP. Emphasizing on the authentication between RSU and vehicle, we describe our scheme in the scenario of single RSU and multiple vehicles. VOLUME 6, 2018
A. OFFLINE REGISTRATION PHASE
The offline registration phase is intended for the VANETs initialization including the essential key information arrangement, and vehicle registration to TA. In our assumption, it is prerequisite for each vehicle to register to TA initially. The unique license plate number ID i is assigned to the legitimate vehicle in offline mode, which is constant the whole time. Moreover, the registered vehicle sets up its own password pw i independently. In this case, the pw i is one-to-one mapped to the individual plate number ID i . The corresponding driver's personal information including the identity number, social security number, home address, as well as the contact information will be recorded in his/her personal profile. Similarly, the vehicle information involving ID i and pw i are kept confidential and stored in TA side. Note that TA is responsible for managing the records of all the registered vehicles. In other words, the (ID i , pw i ) pair is only known to TA and the driver. Assuming there are total n registered vehicles, the user database containing {ID i , pw i } i∈ [1,n] is maintained by TA for further usage.
Subsequently, TA initializes the system parameters and generates the master key for both RSUs and registered vehicles. Let P be the generator of a cyclic additive group G TA and m ∈ Z * p be the system master key where Z * p is defined as a nonnegative integer set less than a large prime number p. Hence, the system public key M is calculated by TA as
where the public key M and the generator P will be published to all RSUs and vehicles. As mentioned above, In the proposed system model, multiple RSUs are deployed by the roadside, each of which is assigned the partial secret key f i intended for secure V2R transmission. Meanwhile, all the RSU partial keys are randomly generated by TA. The {f 1 , . . . , f i } key set contains all the involved RSUs partial keys of the VANETs, which are be recorded in TA side. In this case, all the activated RSUs acquire the unique partial key f i , along with the published system public key M and the related generator P, while the initialized vehicle information is not revealed to any RSU. Accordingly, the RSU generates its own partial secret key u i , which is confidential to all. The combination of f i , u i denotes the partial secret key set, where f i and u i are respectively decided by TA and RSU. Thereafter, the RSU public key can be computed as
Note that D i will be broadcast to all. In fact, the TA-RSU transmission for initialization are assumed to be secure with wired connection. At this point, the offline registration for VANETs and vehicle is provided. The major authentication design is conducted in the following authentication phase.
B. AUTHENTICATION PHASE
In this phase, the essential communication rounds between RSU and vehicles are performed in order to offer vehicle verification. In practical circumstances, the vehicles may get access to VANETs at any time, thus the unified group authentication design involving all participated vehicles is not suitable. Therefore, the verification towards individual vehicle is executed independently in our design.
In certain time point T 1 i , we assume that one vehicle approaches the effective communication of certain RSU. The license plate number of the vehicle is defined as ID i with the confidential password pw i . For identification purpose, vehicle first generates the random value r i as its partial secret key, which is kept confidential to TA. Hence, the private key pair of vehicle with ID i is denoted as r i , pw i . Thereafter, with the acquired RSU public key D i , vehicle calculates the key value B i as follows
Meanwhile, two secure cryptographic hash function 
As illustrated above, T 1 i is the current timestamp, and M is the TA master key. Intuitively, the calculation towards VID i involves both the vehicle secret information {r i , ID i , pw i } as well as the public information {M , P, T 1 i }. On this basis, the signature Sig i is achieved as
where H 3 : {0, 1} * × G TA → Z * p denotes another secure hash function. Consequently, vehicle sends B i , T 1 i , VID i , Sig i to the regarding RSU. Specifically, the data integrity and confidentially can be preserved with the hashed signature Sig i .
In RSU side, the message B i , T 1 i , VID i , Sig i is collected. RSU then adopts the stored partial secret key u i and f i , as well as the derived {B i , T 1 i , VID i } to verify whether the following equation holds:
The correctness is elaborated as:
The data integrity is guaranteed in this way. Subsequently, RSU forwards {T 1 i , VID i }, with the acquired r i M to TA for further authentication. It is worth noting that the RSU is responsible for integrity verification on the received message, while the vehicle private key is not revealed. As a result, information leakage of the vehicle can be prevented from the compromised RSUs.
As for TA, the vehicle partial key r i P can be derived as
Thereafter, the delivered VID i is verified by using the stored vehicle information. For each vehicle in ID i , pw i i∈ [1,n] 
RSU:
4:
if Sig i = Sig i then 6: Derive r i M from B i
7:
Forward
TA:
9:
Derive r i P from r i M 10:
Verify VID i
11:
for j = 1 to m do 12: Compute VID j
13:
if VID j = VID i then 14: Output: Authentication completed The above authentication guarantees the validity of vehicle. Hence, the group key gk intended for both V2R and V2V is generated and distributed in this phase. In our design, the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) is deployed for key generation, which provides dynamic key updating without frequent interaction with the rest of the vehicles.
Initially, assuming m vehicles have passed the previous authentication and are requesting for the group key. For better description, we define the m vehicle number as {1, . . . , m}, where 0 < m ≤ n. Hence, TA gathers the m recorded passwords pw i (i ∈ [1, m] ) and computes the intermediate value ∂ g according to
which involves all the registered vehicles. Subsequently, for each vehicle i (i ∈ [1, m]), TA computes
Consequently, the sequence {x 1 , . . . , x m } is obtained. The corresponding y i (i ∈ [1, m] ) is derived with the following requirement:
Note that the x i , y i set represents the feature of certain vehicle i, thus the multiplication is calculated as
Finally, the CRT parameter µ is derived as
which is related to the m requesting vehicles. At this point, TA randomly chooses the group key gk and computes the keying message gk as
which will be finally delivered to all vehicles. For the final delivery on keying message gk , TA adopts the current time stamp T 2 i to the following calculation:
Hence, the signature i is acquired according to
Finally, the verification on message T 2 i , ϒ i , i , i is forwarded to vehicle i.
In vehicle side, the verification towards the received ϒ i and i is conducted first. If the message is valid, the keying information gk is achieved as
At this point, vehicle i could easily derive the group key gk as follows:
Thus, the group key gk is shared between all the m legitimate vehicles, thus it can be used for secure V2R and V2V communication. At this moment, the group key is successfully distributed. The group key distribution process is illustrated in Algorithm 2.
D. GROUP KEY UPDATING STRATEGY
In practical VANETs system, high mobility of the vehicles enables frequent revocation operations. Thus, it is necessary to timely update the distributed group key gk so that the revoked vehicles cannot get access to the future VANETs data. In practical VANETs scenarios, it is common that multiple vehicles leave the monitored road at the same time, for example, the exit ramp of highway. Hence the batch vehicle revocation method is necessary in this case. Similarly, when new vehicles enter the VANETs, it is of significance Compute ∂ g = ∂ g × pw i 5: end for 6: for i = 1 to m do 7: Derive x i , y i 8:
Compute µ = µ + x i × y i 9: end for 10: Compute gk = gk × µ 11: for i = 1 to m do 12: Compute ϒ i , i , i 13:
Vehicle: 15: Validate ϒ i and i
16:
Compute gk , gk
17:
Output: gk 18: end for for TA to update the current group key. We develop the group key updating method in two different scenarios: the vehicle join operation and vehicle revoked operation. The corresponding solutions are respectively given as follows.
1) NEW VEHICLE JOIN OPERATION
We assume the VANETs scenario with m legitimate vehicles defined as {1, . . . , m}, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Accordingly, the m vehicles have already passed the authentication process. Each vehicle is assigned the current group key gk. In our design, the current group key gk is related to the CRT parameter µ, which is the combination of var i with i ∈ [1, m] . In order to describe the group key updating process, it is assumed that additional e (1 ≤ e ≤ n − m) vehicles are about to access the VANETs group communication. For easy description, the new vehicles are named with number {m + 1, . . . , m + e}. Moreover, the newly generated group key is defined as gk + new . In this case, the related CRT computation is based on ID i , pw i of the m + e vehicles in total. Following the CRT process, the calculation for {var 1 , . . . , var m , . . . , var m+e } is conducted. Hence the new CRT parameter µ + new can be derived as
where the previous CRT parameter µ is adopted. Subsequently, TA chooses the new group key gk + new randomly and computes
which will be delivered to all the m + e legitimate vehicles. Finally, in the vehicle side, the gk + new can be acquired as gk
In this way, the group key is updated, with relatively minor modification and low computational complexity.
2) VEHICLE REVOCATION OPERATION
Similar to the above vehicle join operation, we define the scenario with h vehicles to be revoked from the current VANETs system. Among the h vehicles, some vehicles are disconnected from the VANETs, so they are not allowed to access the communication channel in future. The remaining vehicles are assumed to be disabled or compromised entities. Hence, the current utilized group key should be updated so that the revoked vehicles cannot derive new information from VANETs. Currently, the VANETs is assumed to have m legitimate vehicles with defined number {1, . . . , m}, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n. After the revocation, the remaining m − h (1 ≤ h < m) vehicles with number{1, . . . , m − h} should be assigned new group key gk − new . In this way, the revoked vehicles cannot get access to future communication without the new key. Hence the user privacy is preserved. According to the previous introduced CRT process, the new CRT parameter µ − new is derived as
where the previous CRT parameter µ is adopted. Subsequently, TA chooses the new group key gk − new randomly and computes
which will be delivered to all the m + e legitimate vehicles. Finally, in the vehicle side, the gknew can be acquired as
In this way, the group key is updated. The revoked h vehicles cannot derive the messages after revocation. At this point, the group key updating for both join and revocation operations are illustrated. Comparatively, the updating process is efficient and low-cost, thus suitable for practical VANETs with high concurrency.
V. PROPOSED UNSUPERVISED ANOMALY DETECTION METHOD FOR VANETS TRAFFIC
In VANETs scenarios with moving vehicles and short-lived communication links, the RSUs are designed to handle massive messages from large numbers of participating vehicles. Intuitively, all the received messages should be verified before successive processing. In most of the existing research papers, complex pairing techniques are utilized for security assurance, resulting in heavy computation in RSU side. Particularly, multiple verification processes for different vehicles are conducted at the same time, which leads to heavy computation burden for RSU. In this case, the denial of service (DoS) attack can be performed by sending substantial junk messages randomly. The RSU has to check validity of all the junk messages, which severely disrupts the VANETs system. For this consideration, in this section, we introduce the anomaly detection method for the VANETs traffic, which could filter the communication anomalies before the authentication phase. In other words, the abnormal messages will be directly abandoned without going through the identity verification. Consequently, computation cost for authentication in RSU side can be drastically alleviated.
A. METHODOLOGIES
Intuitively, the RSUs deployed by the roadside may be compromised or disabled. Thus, in this paper we consider RSUs as the semi-trusted devices. In our authentication design, the sensitive vehicle data is transmitted to TA via RSU, while RSU itself cannot derive the contents of the encrypted messages. Hence, without revealing the contents of the messages, we adopt the anomaly detection method for all RSU so that the RSUs are able to infer a significant amount of information from the the properly encrypted VANETs traffic.
In our scheme, we utilize the unsupervised learning technique for unlabeled data processing. As a type of machine learning algorithm, unsupervised learning is the training on the data that is neither classified nor labeled. The most common unsupervised learning method is clustering, which is used for exploratory data analysis to find hidden patterns or grouping in data. The clusters are modeled using a measure of similarity defined upon metrics such as Euclidean or probabilistic distance. Many existing clustering algorithms have been widely used in current machine learning studies, such as the k-Means, Gaussian Mixture models, Hidden Markov models, Self-organizing maps, as well as hierarchical clustering [46] . Accordingly, in this paper, we adopt the hierarchical clustering (also called hierarchical cluster analysis or HCA) method, which groups data over a variety of scales by creating a cluster tree or dendrogram. The constructed tree is not a single set of clusters, but rather a multilevel hierarchy, where clusters at one level are joined as clusters at the next level. The endpoint of the HCA is a set of clusters, where each cluster is distinct from each other cluster, and the objects within each cluster are broadly similar to each other. Generally, the HCA can be classified into the Agglomerative and Divisive. The Divisive is a top-down approach where all the observations start in one cluster, and splits are performed recursively as one move down the hierarchy. Reversely, the Agglomerative is a bottom-up approach where each observation starts in its own cluster, and pairs of clusters are merged as one moves up the hierarchy.
In this paper, we adopt the agglomerative hierarchical clustering to detect the anomaly traffic in RSU side. In order to decide which clusters should be combined, an appropriate metric (the measure of distance between pairs of observations) is required. Moreover, the related linkage criterion is adopted to specify the dissimilarity of sets, which is a function for pairwise distances towards the observations in the sets.
As mentioned above, the anomaly detection design is performed by RSUs without revealing the message contents. Intuitively, the RSU is able to infer a significant number of unique characteristics of vehicle behaviors from the properly encrypted network traffic flows. In our design, the traffic flow is defined as a set of packets passing the observation point (RSU) in VANETs during a certain time interval. Hence, our anomaly detection scheme is constructed by analyzing the inherent patterns of the traffic flow instead the individual packet. Note here that in the implemented VANETs system, the packets are roughly designated as the messages actively acquired by RSU. Consequently, the acquired VANETs traffic data are time-related temporal sequences, hence the dynamic time warping (DTW) is adopted. The total cost DTW (X , Y ) of the optimal warping path is defined as the minimal cost among all possible working paths for the two independent sequences X and Y . The DTW (X , Y ) is calculated as the distance metric for agglomerative hierarchical clustering on time-dependent sequences. Subsequently, the average linkage is adopted as the linkage criterion to determine the distance between the clusters, which is defined as
where α and β are two clusters with m and n elements respectively. Our scheme is classified into two successive phases including the preprocessing phase and the VANETs traffic clustering phase. The related anomaly detection framework is presented in Fig. 2 . In the preprocessing phase, the messages are acquired and aggregated by the RSU. The traffic flows are generated and extracted for the following clustering. Subsequently, the agglomerative hierarchical clustering method is presented in the VANETs traffic clustering phase. Note that the dynamic time warping (DTW) is adopted as the distance metric with the average distance to be the linkage criterion of hierarchical clustering. The anomalies can be detected in this way. Finally, the RSU discards the anomaly traffics without going through the authentication process. In this way, the massive messages can be filtered before the formal message verification, which drastically reduces the time consumption occupied for verification in RSU sides.
B. PREPROCESSING PHASE
In the preprocessing phase, necessary preliminary works are done in order to model the VANETs messages into traffic data, which can be handled during the following clustering process. Roughly, the transmitted data within the RSU range includes the messages for authentication, and the data for regular data exchange, both contains the encrypted information and related signature. By active sniffing, the RSU is able to collect random messages within its effective range. Meanwhile, the collected packets are aggregated with the current received information in RSU side. Subsequently, the traffic flows are derived from the original packet data sets, where the certain time interval assumption is used for combining the VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. Anomaly detection framework.
packets into the traffic flow, which is defined as a sequence of packets from the source to destination.
The time interval denoted as η specifies the duration between the first packet and the last packet of the time series. Particularly, we consider the fact that 95% of all packets arrive at most 4.43 seconds after their predecessors [47] . Hence, in our design, the duration between the two successive packets within one traffic flow is limited to 4.5 seconds (η = 4.5). That is, if the new packet is not acquired within η seconds, the current traffic flow is terminated. Specially, assuming the traffic flow ν contains ν packets, with the corresponding time series denoted as {ϑ 1 , . . . , ϑ ν }. The following equation is achieved:
where i is the sequence number, and ϑ i ≤ ϑ i+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ν − 1. At this point, the collected message data are converted into traffic flows with time interval η. Therefore, the preprocessing phase is finished.
C. VANETs TRAFFIC CLUSTERING PHASE
In this phase, the agglomerative hierarchical clustering process towards the previously generated traffic flows is conducted. The optimal warping path for dynamic time warping is adopted as the distance metric. Additionally, the average linkage is used as the link criterion. The detailed process is shown in Fig. 3 .
During the calculation for the optimal distance DTW (X , Y ), the predefined weight values w i is used for emphasizing on specific time series. Accordingly, let ν and σ be two traffic flows with ν and σ time series respectively. In this way, the total distance c p ( ν , σ ) between ν and σ is calculated as ) of the given two traffic flows ν and σ , respectively. The warping path is denoted as p in this case. Intuitively, with the assigned weight metric w i , the total distance is calculated according to the importance of the time series.
In the subsequent clustering step, the average linkage is adopted, which is conducted by calculating the average distance of all the traffic flows within specific clusters. Thereafter, for cluster C i containing n existing traffic flows denoted as {℘ 1 , . . . , ℘ n }, a unique traffic flow ℘ τ is chosen, which has the minimum total distance from the other flows in the cluster. Thus, the chosen ℘ τ is considered as the representative of individual cluster C i . The chosen ℘ τ meets the following requirement: It is worth noting that the ℘ τ is chosen after the clustering is finished. In this way, the newly collected traffic flow ℘ new will directly be compared with ℘ τ of all the clusters. The ℘ new is considered as the element of the cluster C i which possesses the representative
holds. Note that the number of clusters is denoted as δ.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security analysis towards the proposed VANETS certificateless authentication scheme is presented. The security theorems as well as the corresponding proofs are given below.
A. RESISTANCE TO FORGERY AGAINST ADAPTIVE CHOSEN MESSAGE ATTACK
We analysis the unforgeability against chosen message attack in the proposed protocol. The previously introduced Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) in Definition 1 is adopted in the formal proof, along with the forking lemma defined as follows: Definition 4 (Forking Lemma [34] , [48] ): Let A be a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine, given only the public data as input. Within a certain time bound T , if A can produce, with non-negligible probability, a valid signature (m, σ 1 , h, σ 2 ) , where the tuple (σ 1 , h, σ 2 ) can be simulated without knowing the secret key, then, with an indistinguishable distribution probability, there is another machine which has control over the machine obtained from A replacing interaction with the signer by simulation and produces two valid signatures (m, σ 1 , h, σ 2 ) and (m, σ 1 , h , σ 2 ) such that h = h .
Theorem 1: The proposed certificateless authentication scheme is existentially resistant to forgery against adaptive chosen message attack under the assumption of random oracle model if and only if the ECDLP is hard.
Proof: The security of unforgeability is formally defined through the game G 1 . Let A 1 be a probabilistic polynomial time adversary. Note that it is assumed that A 1 has the capability to break the proposed certificateless authentication scheme. Consequently, it is claimed that by serving the following queries from adversary A 1 , the challenger B 1 can get the solution for ECDLP. In other words, B 1 can break the ECDLP by achieving r i from (M , r i M ). In G 1 , the utilized hash functions denote the random oracles. Moreover, the hash lists are maintained by B 1 . In order to solve ECDLP, it is assumed that B 1 is able to simulate all the oracles. The following corresponding queries to B 1 can be conducted by 
At the same time, another signature B i , T 1 i , VID i , Sig i is derived by A 1 illustrated as
Hence, h 2 = VID i − h 1 = h 2 . In this way, r i P = r i P, which is contradicts the aforementioned assumption.
B. RESISTANCE TO REPLAY ATTACK
In our authentication scheme, the reusing of the previous acquired messages cannot pass the current authentication phase. With the usage of timestamp T 1 i , the calculation of VID i and Sig i based on hash function varies every time. Moreover, the vehicle partial secret key r i is randomly generated by vehicle itself, which guarantees the freshness of the signature Sig i .
Theorem 2: During the certificateless authentication process, replay attack can be prevented. That is, the previous messages of the previous authentication sessions cannot pass the current authentication process.
Proof: Assuming that in timepoint T 1 , the adversary A 2 has access to all the published parameters with the all the transmitted messages during the interval [T 0 , T 1 ] (T 0 < T 1 ). In this case, A 2 chooses the message
. In future time point T f , the legitimate message is calculated as
Note that the modified message B i , T f , VID i , Sig i with new timestamp T f cannot pass the verification process with the newly generated r i in H 2 (r i P, T f , pw i ) and
Consequently, the proposed authentication scheme is resistant to replay attack.
C. PROVISION TO IDENTITY PRIVACY PRESERVING
In practical VANETs environment, it is possible that the adversary (insider/outsider attacker) could conduct illegal tracing towards certain vehicle, which severely damages the vehicle privacy. For this consideration, the real identity of the vehicle cannot be revealed during the communication process. Moreover, the user unlinkability should be provided for all the participating vehicles, where the messages sent from the same vehicle cannot be linked by the adversary. The brief description is given as follows.
Theorem 3: The proposed authentication scheme provides the resistance to illegal tracing, as well as the unlinkability for vehicle. That is, the adversary cannot trace particular vehicle by analyzing the featured identity from the transmitted messages.
Proof: In our design, the constant plate license number ID i , as well as the settled password pw i , is not directly transmitted during the whole process. Instead, the random value r i , and the current timestamp T 1 i are used for hash calculation. Similarly, the randomly generated u i in RSU side provide changeable RSU public key D i . Hence, the vehicle privacy can be provided in our scheme.
D. SESSION KEY ESTABLISHMENT
In the VANETs environment, it is necessary to generate a shared session key between the TA and vehicle so as to guarantee the data confidentiality and transmission security.
Theorem 4: Our authentication scheme provides the shared session key gk between vehicle and TA.
Proof: According to the protocol design, the final group key gk is generated by TA and then delivered to valid vehicles. The gk is adopted as the group key between TA and all the legitimate vehicles. Particularly, the CRT is utilized in the gk generation process, where the vehicle passwords are involved. Due to the unique feature of CRT encryption, the corresponding group key updating process guarantee fast vehicle join and revocation operation. Specifically, during the updating process, it is not necessary for the current legitimate vehicles to update their related key for decryption. That is, if the existing vehicle has not been revoked by TA, the newly distributed key can easily be derived using its own password pw i according to gk = gk mod pw i . Otherwise, the revoked vehicle cannot acquire the new group key correctly. Hence, the group key can be successfully distributed and updated in our scheme.
E. CERTIFICATELESS AUTHENTICATION
The certificateless authentication feature is provided in our scheme, where key escrow problem can be prevented in this way. In this section, we analysis the certificateless authentication property as follows.
Theorem 5: The proposed protocol can provide certificateless authentication for vehicles. The compromised RSU cannot revealed the confidential key message of particular vehicle. Furthermore, the TA cannot impersonate legitimate vehicles with the acquired key. Proof: As illustrated above, during the authentication phase, both TA and RSU have zero knowledge about the selfgenerated random partial key r i in the vehicle side. According to ECDLP, TA cannot derive the r i from r i P, either. In this way, the impersonation of certain vehicle cannot be prevented. Moreover, in our system model the RSUs are assumed to be semi-trusted entities that may be compromised by adversary. As a result, the messages under communication between RSU and vehicle are encrypted using the confidential key known only between TA and vehicle itself. Hence, RSUs cannot acquire the vital key information as well as the vehicle personal data.
F. COMPARISON ON SECURITY PROPERTIES
In this section, the comparison in terms of the major security properties for VANETs is presented. The proposed protocol is compared with the stat-of-the-art VANETs authentication scheme including PFCA [23] , DAKM [44] , CARD [6] . As shown in Table 2 , our protocol yields the desirable security properties.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the performance analysis towards the proposed protocol. Our analysis on the performance mainly emphasizes on the storage overhead, the computation cost, the communication cost, which are the dominant factors in the proposed protocol. Additionally, the experiments are conducted, which emphasizes on the execution time for whole authentication process on RSU side.
A. STORAGE OVERHEAD
In the VANETs environment, the storing capacity of the vehicle is limited. Thus, for authentication scheme, it is impractical for the vehicle to provide large memory for the massive key information. Furthermore, individual RSU is in charge of continuous data exchange with the active vehicles within its range. As a result, relatively low storage overhead for authentication in both the vehicle and the RSU is mandatory. Especially, as the major component of VANETs, the TA is assumed to have adequate storing ability through the intensive data exchange with cloud server. Therefore, the storage overhead in TA side is not considered here. The proposed protocol is compared with the stat-of-the-art VANETs authentication scheme including PFCA [23] , DAKM [44] , CARD [6] on storage overhead.
As for the vehicle in the proposed protocol, some essential key information is previously stored during the registration. In offline registration phase of the proposed scheme, the ID i , pw i is distributed to vehicle as the constant and confidential private key all the time. The necessary parameters for the computation of B i , T 1 i , VID i , Sig i includes the RSU public key D i , the random generated partial key r i , as well as other public information. Moreover, the current timestamp T 1 i is stored and timely updated. Accordingly, we assumed the length of elements in G TA is 256 bits. The length of key information including pw i , r i , VID i , and Sig i are assumed to be 160 bits. Moreover, the lengths of the adopted time stamps T 1 i , and the plate license number ID i of the vehicle are 32 bits and 24 bits respectively. At this point, the storage overhead for each vehicle is 24 + 256 × 4 + 160 × 4 + 32 = 1720 bits. Similarly, in the following group key distribution phase, the length of the generated group key gk, the keying message gk , and the received ϒ i , i , i is 160 bits, while the length of the refreshed timestamp T 2 i is assumed to be 32 bits. In this way, the total storage cost can be summarized as 1720 + 160 × 5 + 32 = 2552 bits.
Subsequently, the storage overhead in RSU side includes key information of RSU itself such as u i , f i , and the delivered messages from all participated vehicles. Note that in practical scenario, large amounts of regular transmitted data are sent from vehicles. However, we consider only the storage consumption for authentication process of all the n vehicles. Accordingly, the total storage cost for RSU is (256 + 160 × 5 + 32 × 2)n + 160 × 2 + 256 × 4 = (1120n + 1344) bits. The comparison result on VANETs authentication schemes are illustrated in Table 3 . Apparently, minor storage cost is required in our scheme emphasizing on both the vehicle and RSU side.
B. COMPUTATION COST
In this section, we analyze the computation cost in both vehicle and RSU side by discussing the necessary VOLUME 6, 2018 calculations required for authentication and group key distribution. For better description, the modulo operation, the exponential operation, and the bilinear pairing are solely defined as mod, Ex, andê. Meanwhile, Enc and Dec are shortened for encryption and decryption. Additionally, H , M , D, and A represent one-way hash function, multiplication operation, division operation, and addition operation respectively. Finally, the point multiplication operation is dented as p. The comparison results on computation cost is presented in Table 4 , which shows that the relatively smaller computations are conducted for resource-limited VANETs vehicles.
C. COMMUNICATION COST
In this section, we discuss the required communication rounds for the successful authentication in RSU side, where totally n vehicles get involved. In our design, for each vehicle, only 2 rounds are required for message sending and receiving. Hence, with the additional 1 broadcast, the total communication rounds for each RSU is 2n + 1 in our design. Accordingly, the comparison result on communication cost is given in Table 5 , indicating that our scheme requires less communication than the remaining state-of-the-art VANETs methods.
D. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In this subsection, the experiment regarding the proposed authentication scheme is illustrated, which can be divided into two parts. First, the proposed anomaly detection method is executed individually. Note that in our design, the anomaly detection operations are conducted by RSU, where the aggregated traffic data are unlabeled VANETs data. As a result, the unsupervised agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm is adopted. Moreover, our design deploys the average distance to be the linkage criterion, while the scenarios with complete linkage and single linkage are also processed. In complete linkage clustering, the distance between those two elements (one in each cluster) that are farthest away from each other is adopted as the distance between clusters. Meanwhile, in single linkage clustering, the distance between two clusters is determined by those two elements (one in each cluster) that are closest to each other. The DTW distance with optimal warping path is regarded as the distance metric. The comparison result on the detection rate for VANETs anomalies is presented in Fig. 4 , which shows that the average linkage outperforms the remaining complete and single linkage on traffic detection. Furthermore, the performance comparison between our authentication scheme and the state-of-the-arts in terms of execution time for complete authentication process is also evaluated. The experiments are conducted on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS with a 2.70 GHz Intel(R) Core i7-6820HK CPU and 16GB memory. The Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) library built on the GMP library is implemented for mathematical operations underlying pairing-based cryptosystems. The simulation is conducted with Python 3.5 with the installed pypbc. The proposed certificateless scheme without the anomaly detection method being executed is denoted as ''The proposed authentication scheme-1'', along with the comparison of PFCA [23] , DAKM [44] and CARD [6] . Meanwhile, the authentication scheme combing the unsupervised anomaly detection strategy is defined as ''The proposed authentication scheme-2'', with the assumption of 15% of anomalies among all authentication requests. Note that the we only consider the traffic for authentication, while the normal vehicle data transmission is not included. As shown in Fig. 5 , the proposed scheme (the curve marked with green color) requires minor execution time in RSU side. Comparatively, the CARD scheme achieves highest operating time with 2n pairing operations, where the pairing calculation leads to higher computation cost. Moreover, the proposed authentication scheme with anomaly detection method outperforms all, providing efficient authentication in practical VANETs scenarios. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
Emphasizing on the secure authentication in VANETs environment, we present a secure certificateless authentication with unsupervised anomaly detection in this paper. In our design, certificateless authentication technique is deployed for conditional privacy preserving and group key distribution. Furthermore, the corresponding unsupervised anomaly detection method is designed, which applies dynamic time warping (DTW) for distance measurement. The security analysis shows that our scheme can achieve desired security properties. Similarly, the given performance analysis demonstrates that our design is efficient compared with state-of-the-arts.
